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This paper presents a qualitative study, consisting of six focus groups 
organized according to the age of participants, on public attitudes 
surrounding the right to privacy.  Several major findings emerged from 
these focus groups, including qualitative evidence that suggests that age 
does not play a major role in respondents’ attitudes toward privacy.  Based 
upon these findings and other patterns in respondents’ attitudes, we 
advance a theory that relates people’s opinions on the value of privacy 
within society writ large to their perceptions of an individual’s ability to 
protect his or her personal information.  Finally, we conclude by 
speculating about a new conception of privacy—one that may comport 
with a world where the pace of technological innovation is extraordinary.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We call this project the “Frog Project” and we call ourselves the 
“Frog Team.”  Although we each have had longstanding interests in 
various privacy policies, the catalyst for bringing us together was 
revisiting a column in The New York Times, which quoted Laurence 
Tribe, referencing an old parable about a frog relishing the warmth of 
his bath, only to find it gradually getting unbearably hot.  As Tribe stated 
in the context of privacy: 
The more people grow accustomed to a listening environment 
in which the ear of Big Brother is assumed to be behind every 
wall, behind every e-mail, and invisibly present in every 
electronic communication, telephonic or otherwise—that is 
the kind of society, as people grow accustomed to it, in which 
you can end up being boiled to death without ever noticing 
that the water is getting hotter, degree by degree.1  
Tribe’s reflections, and our own experiences, initially led us to an 
informal weekly discussion session on privacy-implicated matters.  We 
began by revisiting materials familiar to all students of civil 
liberties—the famous Supreme Court discovery of a “right to privacy”2 
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,3 the revisiting of the origins of this 
right in Roe v. Wade,4 and the expansion of the Court’s interest from 
 
 1 Bob Herbert, What’s Left Unsaid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/opinion/whats-left-unsaid.html. 
 2 See generally Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 715 
(2010) (discussing the use of the right to privacy as the legal basis for court cases 
moving forward); see also Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 483 (2017) (discussing broadly the right to privacy in a contemporary context). 
 3 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
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personal autonomy matters to more of the surveillance issues of the 
twenty-first century.5  But what became clear to all of us very quickly 
was how limited these doctrinal considerations were, and how they 
dramatically lagged exploring privacy matters in domains that affect 
most of us the majority of the time. 
The gap between our “old reliable” court cases and our daily 
experiences gave birth to this project.  We were interested in “things 
privacy,” and were determined to discern the public opinion about the 
water seemingly getting hotter—maybe even getting to the boiling 
point!  We were resolved to explore this issue without 
prejudgment—without wringing our hands about a public cringing in 
the rapid advent of a dystopian world.  There were many ways to 
proceed, but we opted for exploratory, open-ended, qualitative data 
collection rather than for a more rigorous (and confining) quantitative 
approach.  More details about our approach can be found in the research 
design section below.6  Here we note our overarching research 
interest—to understand responses to the often-mind-boggling pace of 
technological innovations and the implications of these innovations for 
one’s privacy.  Although our goals included gingerly testing some 
hypotheses, for the most part, our interests were descriptive: learning 
how the public felt about a range of privacy issues, and from these views 
teasing out more themes that capture, in nuanced ways, public 
attitudes—or lack thereof—on the bathwater very quickly heating up. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A comprehensive review of the vast compilation of existing privacy 
literature was beyond the scope of our research.  Instead, we began by 
focusing on Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s law review article, The 
Right to Privacy,7 which fellow scholars have endlessly referenced.  
Warren and Brandeis contended that a right to privacy existed within 
American society and that this right was derived from earlier contract 
and property common law precedents.8  They argued that a right to 
privacy should be understood as a qualified right, simply meaning “the 
 
 5 See generally Milton Heumann et al., Privacy and Surveillance: Public Attitudes on 
Cameras on the Street, in the Home, and in the Workplace, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 
60–74 (2016) (examining the legal issues implicated in the increased use of 
surveillance). 
 6 See infra Part III. 
 7 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 8 Id. at 208. 
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right to be let alone.”9  This explicit legal right was deemed 
fundamentally necessary in response to a multitude of factors: 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the 
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has 
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and 
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but 
modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions 
upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.10 
The notion that privacy was a fundamental necessity is one of the 
central themes of another important piece of the literature on privacy.  
Alan Westin’s work, Privacy and Freedom, approached the issue of 
defining privacy and explaining its function within differing societies 
from a sociological perspective.11  Westin stated that privacy was more 
than a personal preference, but instead, “an important functional 
requirement for the effective operation of a social structure.”12  Warren 
and Brandeis presented their conception of a right to privacy within the 
legal understanding that this protection was qualified, not absolute.13  
Similarly, Westin argued that each society struggles with finding “an 
overall equilibrium” between demands for privacy balanced with other 
societal demands.14  This struggle was conceptualized based on a crucial 
idea: “[A]ll individuals are constantly engaged in an attempt to find 
sufficient privacy to serve their general social roles as well as their 
individual needs of the moment.  Either too much or too little privacy 
can create imbalances which seriously jeopardize the individual’s 
well-being.”15  
In addition to this sociological conceptualization of privacy, Westin 
speculated that this endless struggle for achieving a balance between 
privacy and other societal interests could be seriously complicated by 
future technological developments.16  The first possible threat was that 
technological and legal developments would enable the expansion of 
sophisticated surveillance capabilities, which would threaten individual 
 
 9 Id. at 193; see also THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS 
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (1879) (Warren and Brandeis adopted the 
phrase from this treatise by Judge Thomas Cooley). 
 10 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 196. 
 11 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 2 (Daniel J. Solove, ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
 12 Id. at 64 (quoting ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 375 (1957)). 
 13 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 214–18. 
 14 WESTIN, supra note 11, at 27. 
 15 Id. at 44. 
 16 Id. at 91–95. 
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and collective privacy.17  The second was that technological 
developments could increasingly allow outsiders to access information 
that an individual desired to remain confidential.18  Lastly, the already 
occurring practice of collecting data related to individuals’ activities 
could be vastly expanded to allow government and private 
organizations to compile a large collection of data that could effectively 
lead to a dossier on every individual.19  Westin’s three predictions 
proved to be incredibly accurate. 
Case law on privacy matters is of comparatively more recent 
vintage.  Initially, the Court gave its attention to matters of personal 
autonomy—birth control,20 abortion,21 and then same-sex marriage.22  
Then, more recently and more significantly for this paper, the Court 
began examining technological issues.  In Riley v. California, law 
enforcement searched the car of appellant David Leon Riley after 
discovering his possession of an invalid driver’s license.23  The search of 
his car was lawful, and led to his arrest for possession of firearms—but 
this was not the search Riley was appealing.24  Upon searching his car, 
police confiscated his phone and searched that, as well.25  The contents 
on his phone provided police with evidence of his gang affiliation, 
leading to separate charges, including shooting at an occupied vehicle, 
attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm.26  Riley 
appealed on his Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that the evidence 
found in his phone should not be admitted at trial.27  The Court ruled in 
his favor, holding that the warrantless search exception (aimed at 
protecting law enforcement) did not apply, as digital data cannot 
possibly harm the officers, and the evidence could have easily been 
preserved until the officers obtained a search warrant.28  The Court 
classified cell phones as “minicomputers”29 that contain extensive 
 
 17 Id. at 97–143. 
 18 Id. at 145–49. 
 19 Id. at 173–84. 
 20 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
 21 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
 22 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 652 (2015). 
 23 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014). 
 24 Id. at 379. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.  
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 398–99. 
 29 Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. 
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private information and held that any information stored via “cloud 
computing” is not even technically on the arrestee’s person.30  
Chief Justice Roberts, in his opinion for the Court, addressed this 
concern by stating, “The fact that technology now allows an individual 
to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any 
less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”31  
Obtaining a warrant is necessary to search a phone, as it is a separate 
piece of evidence and phones are “such a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were 
an important feature of human anatomy.”32  That the Chief Justice would 
liken cell phones to a person’s anatomy is a testament to the intimacy of 
the data stored on these devices.  
In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court further 
distinguished between cell phones and other potential sources of 
evidence.33  Rather than examining the protections for information 
found on a cell phone, as was done in Riley, Carpenter explored the 
protections for information about a cell phone, including the location 
and movements of the cell phone (and potentially its user).34  Called “cell 
site” location information (CSLI), this data provided the evidence 
needed to charge appellant Timothy Carpenter with aiding and abetting 
armed robbery involving interstate commerce, making it a federal 
offense.35  Carpenter appealed, claiming that the warrantless search and 
seizure of this data was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and 
the Court agreed.36  In a separate decision, the Court held that Fourth 
Amendment protections not only include property interests but extend 
to reasonable expectations of privacy.37  With respect to privacy rights, 
the Court declined to extend the “third-party doctrine”—which argues 
that any information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable 
expectation of privacy—to CSLI, as this type of location data is more 
intrusive than the third-party doctrine could reasonably encompass.38  
Thus, the Court required a separate warrant for the access of location 
data, further bolstering privacy rights in an evolving digital age.39 
 
 30 Id. at 397–98. 
 31 Id. at 403. 
 32 Id. at 384.  
 33 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
 34 Id. at 2214. 
 35 Id. at 2212–13. 
 36 Id. at 2220.  
 37 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
 38 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. 
 39 Id. 
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Despite the increasing number of privacy-related cases appearing 
before the Supreme Court, scholars have continued to wrestle with 
conceptualizing the function of privacy within American society.  Judge 
Richard Posner noted that privacy is simply misunderstood and is 
fundamentally about concealment.40  Posner observed that 
“[individuals] want to manipulate the world around them by selective 
disclosure of facts about themselves,” and that this conception of 
privacy can be considered harmful rather than beneficial for society as 
a whole.41  Frequently critiqued by Solove and other fellow scholars, this 
portrayal of privacy is more controversial than not.  In his work, Nothing 
to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security, Solove argues 
that the lack of a definitive conception of privacy has resulted in 
separate privacy protections being continually balanced against other 
societal demands.42  Contemporary societal issues, particularly issues of 
national security, have resulted in individuals’ forfeiture of privacy 
protections for a wide range of benefits.43  
The idea that individuals have continued to trade privacy for other 
perceived benefits has also been addressed in the most recent notable 
work regarding privacy: Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance 
Capitalism.  Individual information has become the fuel driving this new 
form of “surveillance capitalism,” which Zuboff defined as “parasitic and 
self-referential.  It revives Karl Marx’s old image of capitalism as a 
vampire that feeds on labor, but with an unexpected turn.  Instead of 
labor, surveillance capitalism feeds on every aspect of human’s 
experience.”44  Furthermore, Zuboff explains how the commodification 
of individual behavior has created the most valued good within this new 
form of capitalism at the direct expense of privacy protections within 
society.45 
Finally, of importance for our work, we examined two major 
quantitative studies that presented a glimpse into American attitudes 
about the issue of privacy.  The first study was published in 1981 by Alan 
Westin in the wake of the passage of the 1974 Federal Privacy 
Protection Act and the establishment of the Privacy Protection Study 
 
 40 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978). 
 41 Id. at 400.  
 42 DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
24–26 (2011). 
 43 Id. at 55–57. 
 44 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE 
AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 7–8 (2019). 
 45 See id. at 99–102.  
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Commission.46  Westin’s study was designed to evaluate if this 
unprecedented federal legislation, which included the establishment of 
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, addressed privacy concerns 
highlighted in earlier published research.47  Additionally, Westin sought 
to specifically identify “what degree privacy can and should be 
protected in an intensely service-oriented, technologically-based 
society—a society whose collective ‘marketplace’ is fundamentally 
fueled by the collection, storage, and use of the personal information of 
its citizens.”48  The second major quantitative study we examined was 
the 2019 Pew Privacy Study, which was designed to gauge American 
attitudes toward specific contemporary privacy issues and potential 
threats facing them.49  Despite being separated by thirty-eight years, 
data from both studies presented a significant number of interesting 
correlations that should be further explored in a separate research 
project examining American attitudes toward privacy over time.  
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
In our research, we aimed to collect rich qualitative data well 
beyond the constrained responses available within a survey 
questionnaire.  Our study asks individuals to elaborate not only on their 
attitudes toward privacy but on why they believe they and their 
associates have developed such attitudes.  We conducted six focus 
groups to collect the privacy data.  A priori, we hypothesized that the 
age of the respondents might often be an explanatory variable, and thus 
we structured the design to test that theory.  Specifically, we conducted 
six focus groups, two groups for each of three age ranges.50  Each focus 
group was two hours long, and the median number of participants in 
each was seven.  For most of the focus groups, all five of the authors 
participated,51 and we each led the discussion on different sections of 
 
 46 Fair Fin. Info. Practices Act: Hearing on S. 1928 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 480–82 
(1980). 
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. at 576 (remarks of Dr. Alan F. Westin).  
 49 See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling 
Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RES. CTR.  (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-
concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information. 
 50 We used the following three age group classifications: “Young Adults,” aged 
approximately 18–30, “Middle Age,” aged approximately 31–65, and “Seniors,” aged 65 
and older. 
 51 On occasion, one of the authors had to be absent (illness, work conflicts, etc.) from 
a focus group.  Generally, though, all or most were present for every group session. 
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the interview schedule.  A copy of our questions can be found in 
Appendix A.52 
Our subject matter ranged over a large number of privacy matters, 
and we tried to balance adhering to the interview schedule with 
allowing discussions to flourish, even when they deviated somewhat 
from the questions at hand.  Indeed, the inter-participant exchanges 
yielded some of our most intriguing results.  After each of the focus 
groups, the authors individually wrote up the sessions, reporting on 
what the discussants said and reflecting on their comments.  
Synthesizing these focus group reports, comparing responses across the 
six groups, and discussing our conclusions as a research team yielded 
the data that we now review. 
IV.  FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS 
A.  Age Rejected: The Dog That Didn’t Bark! 
We begin by acknowledging the rejection of the hypothesis about 
which we were most confident in its explanatory power.  Specifically, it 
seemed to us that the age of the respondents would matter in a rather 
systematic way as we explored the implications of the “right to privacy” 
and technological developments.  Our initial intragroup discussions led 
us to hypothesize that younger respondents were less agonized about 
privacy tradeoffs and were more accepting of a wide range of 
technological developments that, potentially, could lead to lessened 
privacy.  To our surprise, this hypothesis was not confirmed.  As each of 
us studied our focus group findings, we marveled at just how wrong we 
were.  The themes discussed below did not characterize a specific age 
group but instead crosscut these groups.  Delving into why the “dog 
didn’t bark” and why age was not a good explanatory variable 
(intriguing to speculate about) allows us a first peek into the general 
attitudes of the respondents—across all ages! 
For instance, “consent” was one topic that we hypothesized would 
be particularly split by age.53  U.S. federal law permits the recording of 
individual-to-individual conversations by one party without the 
knowledge or consent of the other party or parties involved, as long as 
 
 52 See infra Appendix A. 
 53 In our preliminary research discussions, there seemed to be a clear divide 
between older individuals, who favored two-party consent laws, and younger 
individuals, who were generally amicable to one-party.  This anecdotal trend was not 
replicated in the focus groups. 
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at least one person is aware of the recording.54  Thirty-eight states and 
the District of Columbia also have what are called “one-party consent 
laws.”55  Even in two-party states, certain exceptional circumstances 
allow only one party to be privy to the knowledge of a recording taking 
place.  Some exceptions may include recordings made by police or law 
enforcement officials, emergency or first responders, or communication 
service providers, as well as recordings made pursuant to a court 
order.56  Individual states have their own exceptions.57 
We found that the majority of respondents, regardless of age, 
preferred a two-party system.  While many acknowledged exceptional 
circumstances, such as in cases of domestic abuse or in situations with 
uneven power dynamics (e.g., employee-employer), the consensus was 
that two-party systems enabled transparency and trust, rather than the 
instilled sense of paranoia that they did not want to become the norm.  
Those exceptions, they argued, should not become the rule.  The idea of 
“everyone going around recording each other,” as one respondent said, 
“would set up a dangerous precedent.”58  Many others agreed that a 
slippery slope toward a “surveillance society” was an inherent threat to 
overall privacy, with one person making a principled argument that 
“privacy is [my] right, why should I have to give it up?”59  In opposition, 
the minority that chose the one-party system claimed that if they had 
nothing to hide, they did not care who recorded them and why—saying 
that safety or protection was worth sacrificing privacy.  Some 
 
 54 Recording Phone Calls and Conversations, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT, 
https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/recording-phone-calls-and-conversations (last 
visited April 13, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)). 
 55 Id.  Two-party states also differ as to whether both parties must consent explicitly 
(i.e., “Yes, I consent to being recorded.”), or whether conversing after notification of 
recording has been provided is sufficient for implicit consent.  The eleven other states 
(California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington) have “two-party consent laws” (or “all-
party”) in effect.  State Law: Recording, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT, https://www.dmlp.org/
legal-guide/state-law-recording (last visited April 19, 2021). 
 56 For a lengthier exploration of recording consent laws, see Rauvin Johl, Reassessing 
Wiretap and Eavesdropping Statutes: Making One-Party Consent the Default, 12 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 177, 178–80 (2018). 
 57 Id.  For example, Illinois and Oregon are two-party states except in cases of 
electronic recording.  Another example is Hawaii, which only requires all-party consent 
in cases where the recording device is installed in a private place.  Massachusetts, for 
instance, is the only state without a “public location” exception, meaning that a 
conversation occurring in a public place still requires two party consent.  States also 
vary as to how consent is executed, and whether such recordings are admissible in court.  
 58 Member of Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on 
file with author). 
 59 Member of Focus Group 4 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 20, 2019) (on file 
with author). 
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respondents went as far as saying the so-called surveillance society 
already exists; privacy in the modern day is so far eroded that, as one 
respondent claimed, “everything is being recorded anyway.”60  Despite 
preconceived notions concerning general familiarity with technology, 
attitudes toward recording consent laws, and privacy more broadly, 
participant’s ages could not explain this dynamic. 
B.  Protecting Privacy and Terms of Service Agreements: Reality or 
Illusion? 
We can further deduce the extent to which society has prioritized 
other interests over privacy, such as leniency with business, through 
close examination of Terms of Service (TOS) agreements.  Upon review 
of focus group attitudes about this issue, three facets of the agreements 
emerge as potentially problematic: (1) the actual policies that permit 
companies to collect vast quantities of personal data; (2) the mechanism 
employed to obtain consent from users; and (3) the societal costs 
incurred from not accepting these agreements, which in turn apply 
pressure on users to consent irrespective of the agreement’s provisions.   
The first facet was only problematic for a minority of our 
respondents—those that viewed the mere act of data collection itself as 
invasive.  This, however, is the most lucrative aspect of several 
companies’ business models, and the most necessary for others.  Google 
turns a profit by using data collected from consumers to sell targeted 
advertising but also needs this data to power improvements to the 
Google search engine and Google maps.61  Amazon and Apple take voice 
recordings from Alexa62 and Siri,63 respectively, to improve the accuracy 
of their voice recognition software.  Almost all companies use cookies 
when accessing their websites, which track consumer data as they move 
from webpage to webpage.64  When viewed individually, this data seems 
small and innocuous.  The issue is when these data are aggregated into 
a larger profile that tells companies more than what consumers 
 
 60 Focus Group 2 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 61 Nicole Lindsey, Google Data Collection Is More Extensive and Intrusive Than You 
Ever Imagined, CPO MAGAZINE (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-
privacy/google-data-collection-is-more-extensive-and-intrusive-than-you-ever-
imagined. 
 62 Alexa Terms of Use, Section 4.1, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 63 Ask Siri, Dictation, & Privacy, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210657, 
(last updated Feb. 19, 2021).  
 64 What are Cookies?, INDIANA UNIV., https://kb.iu.edu/d/agwm (last updated Jan. 18, 
2018). 
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expected it would reveal.  For instance, while individual facts about a 
person may confer little information when considered on their own, 
taken together, these facts may paint a more complete picture of that 
person than what the consumer intended to divulge.65  One report 
demonstrated that merely going through normal life routines with an 
Android phone led Google to be able to collect enough user data to 
identify user interests accurately.66  One participant was deeply 
troubled by this when he said, “I mean they know so much about you.  
They pretty much own you.  I downloaded all of the data that Google had 
on me.  I had so much data.  I made the mistake of buying a Google 
Pixel.”67  This is often the case—a person may believe they have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, only to discover that their data had 
been collected consistently, and without their knowledge, over an 
extended period. 
TOS Agreements are formatted as either “opt in” or “opt out.”68  
When a website prompts its users to agree, usually at the bottom of a 
page immediately upon opening the site, this specific site is using the 
opt-in style.  If no such prompt appears, users must opt out of using the 
program entirely.69  This may even be less clear in cases when the user 
interface is amorphous.  While nearly all respondents understood that 
they had opted in to Google’s TOS when they used the search engine, 
significantly fewer respondents were aware of Alexa’s voice recordings 
being sent back to Amazon for analysis.70 
We hypothesized that many respondents would not be aware that, 
by using Google’s service, they were agreeing to the corporation’s data 
collection policies.  Most respondents did appreciate, however, that by 
availing themselves of this service (and others), they had acquiesced to 
the corporation’s conditions on the ease with which the organization 
could aggregate data, sell data, and disseminate data.71  They were 
 
 65 See Lindsey, supra note 61. 
 66 Douglas C. Schmidt, Google Data Collection, DIGITAL CONTENT NEXT (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://digitalcontentnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/DCN-Google-Data-
Collection-Paper.pdf. 
 67 Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 68 See Berkson v. GoGo, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing the 
legality of various methods of obtaining consent).  
 69 Id. at 376. 
 70 See Matt Day et al., Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-
10/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio.  
 71 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013) (discussing what individuals lay observers understand in 
terms of data consent laws).  
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aware that they had “opted in” without being given an option to “opt 
out.”  Most respondents were resigned to the fact that this is how TOS 
agreements functioned in practice.  
Taking it one step further, we asked about situations in which the 
organization did ask for explicit authorization to its terms and 
conditions, meaning a person had to affirmatively “opt in” rather than 
being automatically assumed to agree to terms and conditions by using 
the service.  The assumption was that by being given explicit statements 
about what they were agreeing to, respondents would have more choice 
and would have a better handle on what would be done with their 
information, effectively providing more control over the dissemination 
of the information they provided.  A priori, this sounded more than 
plausible, and indeed suggested a policy for addressing privacy issues 
moving forward (we will turn to these in the last section of this paper).72  
But once again, what we assumed was obvious—that a choice to “opt in” 
with specific explanations as to what was being agreed upon would 
enhance an individual’s control over private information—was 
incorrect.  
Of our respondents across all six focus groups, almost no 
respondents claimed to read any parts of the TOS.73  Signing these was 
routine; ignoring their language was universal.  Some bemoaned the 
length of these agreement sheets; some the difficulty of reading them.74  
Even when we probed deeper and suggested altering the terms of the 
agreement in ways consistent with policies being adopted in Europe and 
some states,75 we found at best a grudging response from a few of the 
respondents that maybe one change or another (i.e., highlighting key 
points, shorter forms) might make them give more than a mere cursory 




 72 See infra Section VI.B. 
 73 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract 
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2014) (discussing issues surrounding the lack of reading 
within the context of consumer contract law).  
 74 One Focus Group Participant (from our sixth group, Middle Aged individuals), 
specifically noted that the determining factor behind his reasoning for not reading TOS 
agreements was the perceived complexity of these document’s language.  This 
participant suggested using lower Lexile levels as a standard for encouraging broader 
understanding of these documents.  
 75 See infra Section VI.B. 
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I skim through the TOS agreements, but that is ultimately not 
going to make much of a difference.  If you don’t sign it, you 
don’t get to use the service.  And if it is an electronic copy there 
even isn’t an opportunity to modify it[.]76 
 
There are sometimes 60 pages of TOS . . . you can’t read them 
. . . few know what they say.  You assume they are collecting 
data . . . if there was more of a choice to opt in, just in theory a 
difference, since if you don’t opt in, you can’t use the 
service. . . .  The European Union efforts to change TOS [i.e., 
highlighting, underlining, shortening] won’t matter—no one 
reads them.77 
Somewhat facetiously, another respondent claimed that “all the 
terms and services really need to say is ‘We’re taking all your stuff, we’re 
making money off it, good luck.’”78  His point, of course, was that clients 
really have a sense of what they are giving away but will not change their 
behavior in any case. 
  This turns general contract theory on its head, as contracts are 
generally predicated on the idea of consent being given actively as an 
opt in.  In a 1994 Yale Law Journal article, Peter Schuck wrote, “[t]o say 
that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not voluntarily and 
knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author of her 
own undertakings, that a genuine respect for her dignity requires a 
broad deference to her choices.”79  The issue today is that many people 
cannot opt out of terms such as Google’s or Apple’s without incurring 
opportunity and productivity costs.  Putting together the various 
services and websites respondents visited that had TOS, almost no one 
felt that they could live today without being bound by these contracts.80  
When asked why they continued to use Google despite expressing 
dismay with the way Google collected their data, they replied, “Because 
it’s convenient, and I will be left behind socially.”81  It does not matter if 
 
 76 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 77 Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 78 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 79 Peter H. Shuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994). 
 80 Focus Groups 1–6, Rutgers University (Sept. 13–Oct. 6, 2019). 
 81 Focus Group 2 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019 (on file with 
author). 
HEUMANN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  12:26 PM 
2021] PRIVACY IN THE PUBLIC EYE 1437 
consent is questionably obtained if people do not have alternatives that 
allow them to “voluntarily and knowingly make” other choices.82 
C.  The Role of Government and Corporate Giants: Trust and 
Tradeoffs 
To contextualize privacy and, more importantly, how people 
conceive privacy, we deemed it necessary to decipher the difference 
between the expectations people have of public versus private entities.  
Since many people hold double standards, we found that it was 
beneficial to partake in a simple voting process, revealing the results to 
the group after the voting was completed.  Then, we allowed people to 
attempt to defend their clear contradictions in their conceptions.  
  
 
 82 See Joseph V. Demarco & Brian A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil 
Litigation and the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1016, 1024–26 (2019) (discussing 
lawsuits involving private parties and data storage).  
HEUMANN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  12:26 PM 
1438 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1423 




HEUMANN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  12:26 PM 
2021] PRIVACY IN THE PUBLIC EYE 1439 
Question 2: In general, who do you trust more with the following sets of 
data: private companies or the government? 
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Consistent with our other findings,83 responses were coherent 
across age groups.  We found that, overall, public entities received more 
support, or “trust,” from our focus groups.  We tested this by first 
varying the entities (i.e., the Treasury or credit card companies), but 
asking about a general sense of trust, and then by varying the 
information obtained (i.e., your location), but asking generally “public 
or private.”  We found that when naming specific entities, an 
overwhelming majority selected the public option over the private 
option.  When asking about specific information, though, “the 
government” either won by a very slim majority or even lost the vote.  A 
factor that could be influencing this contradiction is the negative stigma 
attributed to “the government.”  People have always been distrusting of 
this ominous entity, and that is a likely reason for the voting 
discrepancy.  When we asked about specific government agencies, 
though, people realized that these agencies do not warrant a sense of 
fear or distrust, voting in their favor.  Another factor that likely 
influenced our participants in their voting habits is the overwhelming 
news coverage relating to breaches of data by private corporations.  
Focus group participants reported that stories about privacy issues with 
Facebook, Google, and Amazon influenced their decision to pick the 
government agency rather than the specific company.  This could also 
explain why—in an opposite pattern to that of the government—private 
companies generally performed better in the collective than as 
individual companies.  
The one noticeable outlier from the aforementioned trends was in 
the “Associations” question in the second round, where a majority of 
respondents said that they trusted private companies to know this 
information more than the government.  During the focus groups, 
respondents would sometimes respond that they picked private 
companies when they could rationalize the private company knowing 
this information.84  Given the prevalence of social media networks as a 
primary online interface across all generations, it is conceivable that the 
public has largely accepted private companies having detailed 
information on a person’s friend and family network. 
This model of analysis was designed to gauge the “trust,” an 
often-immeasurable feeling, that participants had in various agencies, 
groups, etc.  By seeking a justification as to why the entity would need 
the information we were asking about, participants unveiled their 
reasoning skills, ultimately seeming to draw objective conclusions.  If 
 
 83 See supra Section IV.A. 
 84 Focus group notes, Rutgers University (Sept. 13–Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
HEUMANN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  12:26 PM 
2021] PRIVACY IN THE PUBLIC EYE 1441 
they were able to see a reason for an entity to know that information, 
the decision was made clearer.85  One participant, though, articulated 
the true design of our questioning, stating, “[a] lot of this comes down to 
trust.  How much do you trust the government not to abuse security 
cameras, how much do you trust Apple to do what they say they will 
do.”86  Reinforcing other theories of ours as well, this participant 
categorized the entire government as one entity, while distinguishing 
Apple from other tech giants.  This participant did not pick a side in this 
statement but instead discussed the idea of trading off some privacy for 
increased security.  The government, as he referred to it, is often thought 
of as an entity that strips the general population of privacy with a 
sweeping promise of safety.87  Apple, though, promises security at its 
forefront.88  The participant draws a similarity with these two, 
proposing that they both need to prove their efficacy and their reliability 
in order to gain the trust of the American people. 
V.  THE RESIGNATION CURVE: PROFILES IN PRIVACY 
Across the landscape of themes that surfaced during our focus 
groups, certain patterns emerged that may offer some broader 
explanatory power in deciphering people’s overall attitudes toward 
privacy.  As mentioned, we initially hypothesized that a person’s age 
might be influential in organizing individuals’ opinions on privacy 
relative to one another.  Despite the rejection of our age hypothesis, 
attitudes about privacy were not homogenous.  They could still be 
roughly organized into a loose typology according to their perceived 
ability to control their personal privacy, and according to their 
overarching opinions on the current (and future) state of privacy 
throughout society.  
 
 85 See Auxier et al., supra note 49.  Our methodology for gauging the trust of focus 
group participants was similar to the Pew Privacy Survey’s construction of survey 
questions for gauging the feelings of respondents as related to the sharing of 
information with government and private organizations.  See id.  Participants in the Pew 
Privacy Study responded overwhelmingly that they did not feel the benefits of sharing 
their personal information with the government or private companies outweighed the 
possible risks.  In more in-depth questions, however, there was significant variation in 
the participants’ responses when asked about their feelings toward sharing specific 
types of personal information with the government and private companies.  See id.  
Additionally, there were also significant differences in the participants’ responses when 
asked about their feelings toward sharing personal information with specific types of 
government and private organizations.  See id. 
 86 Focus Group 4 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 20, 2019) (on file with author). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Apple Privacy Policy, APPLE (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.apple.com/legal/
privacy/en-ww. 
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Throughout our various topics of discussion, one feeling guided 
nearly every respondent’s attitude—resignation.  Specifically, almost all 
focus group respondents agreed that the value society places on privacy 
today is historically lower than at any other point in history.89  Nearly 
all focus group respondents also believed—for better or worse—that 
little could be done to change society’s values as they pertain to privacy, 
due in large part to the various competing interests (convenience, 
security, etc.) for which privacy is often exchanged. 
What did vary among respondents, however, was the extent to 
which they perceived their ability to maintain agency over their 
personal privacy.  In other words, despite the belief that new technology 
has pushed society away from privacy writ large, certain respondents 
expressed the idea that technology could also be proactively used—if 
individuals chose to do so—as a safeguard in protecting privacy through 
such practices as private browsing, virtual private networks (VPNs), 
and encryption.90  Moreover, individuals’ general attitudes toward 
society given the current state of privacy also varied, as even certain 
respondents resigned to a world devoid of privacy believed that this was 
not necessarily problematic.  Rather than being consumed with worry 
over the future of privacy, these individuals instead choose to enjoy the 
comfort of warm water, so to speak.  
In reviewing the different attitudes among focus group 
respondents, each respondent could be arranged relative to one another 
based on both their perceived ability to influence their personal privacy 
and their general attitude toward society given the current state of 
privacy.  We call this arrangement the “Resignation Curve,” as 
respondents who possessed extremely negative attitudes or who 
possessed extremely positive attitudes toward society—given the 
current state of privacy—both generally believed there was little that 
could be done to safeguard personal privacy.  A smaller group of 
respondents, who represent the center of the Resignation Curve, 
expressed neither extremely positive nor extremely negative views 
toward the state of privacy but believed there were pragmatic measures 
that individuals could take to safeguard their personal privacy if they 
chose to do so over a competing interest.  
 
 89 See Auxier et al., supra note 49.  Similar to this finding from our focus groups, data 
from the Pew Research Center’s 2019 Privacy Study showed that 70 percent of 
participants responded that their personal information is less secure than compared to 
five years ago.  Id. 
 90 Focus group notes, Rutgers University (Sept. 13–Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
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Respondents could therefore be loosely placed into one of three 
groups along the Resignation Curve: the Defeatists, the Pragmatists, and 
the Futurists.  Respondents do not fit neatly into only one of these 
groups.  Instead, the groups are meant to represent sections of a 
spectrum.  Where respondents fell on this spectrum indicates a rough 
approximation of their attitudes toward privacy.  It is important to note 
that the curve depicted below does not depict the frequency with which 
focus group respondents could be labeled as members of each of these 
groups.  Instead, the Resignation Curve is meant to represent a 
relationship between two categories of attitudes (represented by its 
axes), and whose extremes mark the most typical attitudes of certain 
typologies as outlined below.   
 
A.  The Defeatists: Privacy Is an Illusion!  
The Defeatists’ attitudes were defined by complete and total 
resignation—not just to an individual’s inability to maintain agency 
over his or her privacy but also to the guaranteed negative 
consequences of a society that does not value privacy.  Individuals on 
the left side of the Resignation Curve, where most focus group 
participants could be placed, were specifically resigned to the belief that 
society was now structured such that avoiding incentives to trade 
privacy in exchange for a variety of competing interests (security, 
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convenience, financial gain, etc.)91 would impose a burden on 
individuals far outside what is now considered normal given the 
advancement of technology. 
Consider visual surveillance, for example.92  On a very basic level, it 
is hard to argue against the security that cameras afford over streets, 
university parking lots, and so many other public—and sometimes 
private—locales.  Though one can argue about their deterrent value, few 
argue that the information they provide is not important to identifying 
culprits and so on.93  Similarly, there is an addictive attractiveness to the 
use of Google’s search engine.  The ease, accessibility, and convenience 
are a brew almost impossible to resist ingesting.  Related are the 
unbelievable efficiency rewards of technology: speed of locating 
accounts, storage of information, and myriad other benefits that accrue 
from electronic collection and storage of data.94  Although privacy 
implications of different social policies have been present throughout 
our history,95 the scope of the changes of the past fifty years far exceeds 
anything experienced in our past.  The impossible has become not just 
possible, but a reality, and in some instances, commonplace.  
Many Defeatists largely view this “new normal” as an existential 
threat to democracy and to the United States’ ability to maintain a free 
and open society in which individuals retain their autonomy without the 
auspices of Big Brother or Big Technology watching over them.96  Some 
Defeatists expressed fears that, without privacy, the country was now 
more vulnerable to authoritarianism, given the notion that people now 
fundamentally lack choice in deciding what, where, and to whom to 
divulge information.  Any “choice” concerning whether or not to use a 
service or product (i.e., smartphones, search engines, mapping 
 
 91 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1369, 1371–78 (2017) (discussing privacy as a commodity). 
 92 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936–45 
(2013) (providing a broader discussion of surveillance).  
 93 See generally Milton Heumann et al., Privacy and Surveillance: Public Attitudes on 
Cameras on the Street, in the Home, and in the Workplace, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 
60–74 (2016).  
 94 See Mike Shaw, Why Google is the Best Search Engine (and Why Businesses Should 
Care), TOWER MARKETING (June 15, 2020), https://www.towermarketing.net/blog/
google-best-search-engine. 
 95 See generally LAWRENCE CAPPELLO, NONE OF YOUR DAMN BUSINESS 6 (2019) (exploring 
the history of conflicts surrounding technological advancements that arguably 
conflicted with privacy values). 
 96 See generally Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and 
Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2016) (exploring the public’s interest in 
privacy topics around the time of Edward Snowden’s disclosure of National Security 
Agency surveillance in 2013).  
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applications), as one Defeatist noted, is simply an “illusion,”97 because 
the cost imposed by declining to use such services places a burden on 
the individual outside what is now commonly deemed acceptable.  
While entities may not necessarily force individuals to disclose private 
information, the normalization of using certain technology has 
nevertheless forced individuals to trade their privacy.   
The following is a quote from an individual near the Defeatist end 
of the Resignation Curve: “[N]othing I can do [about Google keeping 
search history] . . . .  It is what it is.  The individual is powerless.  I’m just 
one person.”98  Another Defeatist summarized their feelings by asserting 
the following: “Privacy is an illusion.  I am not sure there is a definition 
of privacy anymore.  It is too late to make material changes in our 
behavior when it comes to using services like Google.  We are already 
hooked.”99  Other Defeatists similarly reported, “I have no privacy and I 
can’t expect it to get any better soon,”100 and, “If you don’t sign [the TOS 
agreement], you don’t get to use the service.”101  Finally, on surveillance 
generally, yet another respondent stated, “There is surveillance all the 
time, all privacy is gone, but nothing to be done.  Barring a catastrophe, 
there is no privacy, it’s almost like a Pandora’s box . . . .  Get used to the 
new world.  What can I do as an individual?”102 
B.  The Futurists: Embrace the New World!  
Focus group respondents at both ends of the Resignation Curve 
shared a key characteristic: when it comes to new norms of information 
sharing, both Defeatists and Futurists believed that resistance is futile.  
Both groups are generally accepting of the “this is the way it is” 
mentality regarding privacy, given the advancement of technology in the 
21st century.  The defining difference between Defeatists and Futurists, 
however, is that the latter tend to believe that this new society is 
trending in a positive direction rather than a negative one.  Futurists, 
unlike Defeatists, generally embrace the technology that Defeatists 
believe to be responsible for the decline of privacy.  Of the three groups 
herein defined, Futurists represent the smallest number of focus group 
participants.  They tend to not only accept the idea that society now 
 
 97 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 98 Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 99 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 100 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 101 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 102 Focus Group 5 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
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values privacy less than ever before but also actively believe that the 
costs of trading away one’s privacy are outweighed by the incentives 
and benefits received from doing so.  
These individuals trumpeted technology’s benefits, and generally 
believed privacy concerns were overblown, exaggerated, and more 
often than not theoretical musings of those far removed from reality.  
Futurists typically based their beliefs on the presumption that new 
technology brings about immense benefits for the “greater good” of 
society, such as heightened security, enhanced abilities to find and 
prosecute criminals, increased health benefits, and greater convenience 
in people’s daily lives.  Many Futurists also acknowledged that this 
advancement is achieved not despite the diminution of privacy but 
because of it.  Individuals along the right side of the Resignation Curve 
sometimes even went as far as to champion the possibilities of mass data 
collection, especially in fields such as human genetics.103  That these 
respondents would not only move past a general acceptance of a society 
dominated by information sharing but also seek to thrive in it is a 
testament to the wide array of opinions expressed—even by small 
subsections of the population—on the topic of privacy. 
The more moderate of these respondents (those more toward the 
center-right of the Resignation Curve) felt that they had “nothing to 
hide,” so privacy intrusions were not much of an intrusion at all.  More 
forceful proponents said that the handwringing, dystopia-invoking 
voices of privacy champions were nothing more than “Chicken 
Littles,”104 exaggerating the costs of technology and not crediting the 
enormous benefits that are associated with change.  Not infrequently, 
these respondents threw down a challenge to the focus group: name a 
privacy concern that has actually materialized and affected individuals 
seriously and negatively.  These challenges often went unanswered by 
other focus group respondents.105  
The following are quotes from individuals near the Futurist end of 
the Resignation Curve: 
Has anyone ever suffered from these privacy concerns we are 
bandying about?  I never did.  I am happy with all that 
technology has given . . . .  I love when the bank knows all 
about my accounts and alerts me to fraud.  I love the fact that 
 
 103 See generally Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357 
(2019) (analyzing privacy considerations surrounding recent advancements in 
genetics).  
 104 CHICKEN LITTLE (Walt Disney Co. 1943). 
 105 See Auxier et al., supra note 49.  When asked if they had recently experienced three 
of the most common privacy harms, respondents from the Pew Study overwhelmingly 
answered in the negative. 
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the doctor knows all about me.  To be frightened is wrong . . . .  
Every change is for the good even if it has good and bad things 
. . . . What are you going to do, stay in your house the whole 
time?106 
 
I am not very concerned with these privacy concerns . . . by 
collecting more data, you get more knowledge . . . through 
machine learning, etc.  It helps scientific progress.  Every 
generation is faced with this [fear].  New information can be 
valuable . . . .  We will get more benefits from AI, machine 
learning.107 
Another Futurist claimed, “I have nothing to hide, so what is the 
problem? There are so many benefits . . . so make some concessions.  I 
don’t think we should let the negatives outweigh the positives.”108  On 
the topic of Google, one Futurist said, “I don’t care enough to use those 
services [alternative to Google].  Sometimes a targeted ad is nice if it is 
what I am looking for.”109  Another Futurist commented, “Google is the 
most phenomenal thing . . . .  [It is] an amazing service that adds 
tremendous value.”110 
C.  The Pragmatists: The Future of Privacy is . . . Different! 
The center of the Resignation Curve is occupied by a small 
subsection of individuals who expressed neither extremely positive nor 
extremely negative views toward society given the current state of 
privacy as they perceived it.  Pragmatists, like almost all focus group 
respondents, also perceived societal values to be trending away from 
privacy.  Despite perceiving this trend, however, Pragmatists 
themselves often still reported that they believed privacy ought to be 
valued and protected because of the benefits it provided—primarily 
those surrounding safeguarding against potential cyber-attacks that 
threaten an individual’s financial or emotional well-being (a threat 
Pragmatists often took seriously).  Depending on which side of the 
Resignation Curve members of this group fell on, Pragmatists were 
either cautiously optimistic or cautiously pessimistic about the 
direction in which society’s privacy values were trending—an attitude 
 
 106 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 107 Focus Group 2 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 108 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 109 Focus Group 5 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 110 Focus Group 4 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 20, 2019) (on file with author). 
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that was largely tied to a Pragmatist’s belief in the extent to which other 
individuals also realized their individual agency over protecting their 
personal privacy.   
The following diagram illustrates how the cross section of certain 
attitudes affects where an individual is placed along the Resignation 
Curve.  This depiction also distinguishes between Negative Pragmatists 
(those on the left side of the curve) and Positive Pragmatists (those on 
the right side of the curve).  As previously stated, there was a subtle 
difference in the attitude Pragmatists took toward their general feelings 
about society given the current state of privacy as they perceived it.  The 
defining characteristic within this group was an individual’s perception 
as to whether or not others also believed that they had individual agency 
to affect their personal privacy.  Many Pragmatists were optimistic as to 
the agency of their peers, while others believed that they were alone in 
their ability or willingness to either resist privacy tradeoffs or take 
certain measures, as explored below, to mitigate the collection of their 
data.  
Resignation Curve Typologies 
 
Unlike their peers at either end of the Resignation Curve, 
Pragmatists cited a variety of ways—to various extents of personal 
usage—that individuals could actually use technology to their benefit in 
protecting personal privacy.  This included practices such as private 
browsing (a means of hiding users’ cookies, the mechanism through 
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which websites track user traffic), VPNs (which allow individuals to 
create secure networks to access the internet), and encryption (a tool 
used to restrict information access).  Knowledge of any one of these 
technologies varied widely among even the Pragmatist group, and many 
respondents—especially younger ones—reported that they were aware 
of such methods to protect individual privacy, but did not actively utilize 
these methods themselves, mostly due to a lack of technical knowledge.  
Despite this fact, the mere existence of such technologies suggested to 
the Pragmatists that perhaps a world devoid of privacy was not 
inevitable, although many remained skeptical that enough people cared 
enough, especially given tantalizing tradeoffs, or had the technical 
knowledge to actually use such privacy-protecting technology (“PPT”).  
For the Pragmatists, even among those who actively engaged with PPT, 
the widespread use of PPT was a necessary step if the protection of 
private information were to ever extend beyond small clusters of 
privacy-concerned individuals.  
The following are quotes from Pragmatists, near the apex of the 
Resignation Curve: “I can choose: do I want to share [information], or do 
I not want to share?”111  “I use DuckDuckGo instead of Google because 
they respect my information.”112  Two Pragmatists highlighted the 
moral duality of technology: “Every technology can be used for good and 
evil . . . .  Encryption is a secure way of storing information.”113  “The 
future of privacy is different.  Not bad or good necessarily—just 
different.”114 
VI.  CONCLUSION: REFRAMING PRIVACY’S MEANING 
The last question we asked focus group participants concerned the 
future of privacy.  We tasked each group to describe, in just a few short 
words, what they expected from this future.  While the responses varied, 
the most cited phrase associated with privacy’s future was 
“meaningless.”  It is noteworthy that this word was used not just by 
Defeatists who were dismayed by a future without privacy but by the 
Futurists who championed the benefits of this new world as well.  
Across the Resignation Curve, nearly every person cast doubt on the 
 
 111 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author). 
 112 Focus Group 5 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 113 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
 114 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
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meaning or purpose that privacy might play in an increasingly digital 
society.  
We have already discussed literary, philosophical, and legal 
conceptions of privacy at length.115  Upon reflecting over the totality of 
the data we gathered, however, it is worth emphasizing a phenomenon 
also discussed by Solove in Nothing to Hide: the lack of a prevailing 
consensus around any single conception of privacy or its alleged 
values.116  This may seem strange given the final responses of our focus 
group participants—how could individuals lament (or even celebrate) 
the loss of privacy’s meaning, when that meaning was never entirely 
clear in the first place?117 
The notion that privacy conceptions are rather ephemeral and 
amorphous in practice is supported by our focus group participants, 
who often struggled to give coherent responses when asked what the 
term “privacy” meant to them.118  It was not until these individuals were 
further prompted that they could even attempt to outline any values 
placed on privacy, and they did so primarily by identifying the types of 
information they sought to keep private.  Even the value of privacy 
respondents assigned to these types of data was purpose-specific and 
was not generally associated with higher ideals involving privacy itself.  
For instance, for the most commonly cited categories—financial and 
health data—respondents explicitly sought to keep this information 
private because of fears over potential financial loss over the exposure 
of that data. 
Among the variety of responses on this topic, however, focus group 
respondents constantly raised one theme, if not a clear definition.  In 
every focus group, the theme of control over one’s personal 
information—or more commonly, the lack thereof—was cited in 
discussions of respondents’ conceptions of privacy.119  Although these 
discussions often also boiled down to a simple “feeling,” that feeling was 
undoubtedly the sense of being in control over one’s personal 
information; irrespective of whether or not a respondent was accepting 
of his or her information being shared, he or she wished to have a say in 
that decision.  Upon reviewing these responses and their implications 
within the larger context of privacy in the US and abroad, it became clear 
 
 115 See supra Part II. 
 116 See SOLOVE, supra note 42, at 24–26. 
 117 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 
(2002) (discussing changing conceptions of privacy over time). 
 118 See infra APPENDIX A 
 119 See Auxier et al., supra note 49.  Similar to our findings here, data from the Pew 
Privacy Study showed that respondents’ conception of privacy is heavily skewed toward 
the idea of control over their personal information.  Id. 
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that reconceptualizing privacy around a more nuanced notion of control 
may be a worthwhile thought experiment to conclude our exploration 
of privacy in the public eye.  
A.  Condition vs. Choice: The Privacy Paradox  
Reconceptualizing privacy around the concept of personal choice 
provides a new resolution to a paradox surrounding the left half of the 
Resignation Curve.120  Defeatists lament their loss of privacy while 
simultaneously sharing their information with Google, Facebook, 
Amazon, etc.  Many Defeatists themselves attribute these 
inconsistencies to an overwhelming feeling of resignation: with privacy 
having “lost its meaning,” many respondents have succumbed to the 
benefits of exchanging privacy for a variety of tradeoffs.  Although 
nearly all respondents agreed that these tradeoffs had immense value, 
many—especially the Defeatists—felt as though they did not always 
retain control over which tradeoffs to make and the extent to which 
their own privacy should be exchanged for the corresponding benefits.  
It is quite possible that when respondents lamented their loss of privacy, 
they were actually lamenting their diminished control over the decision 
to be private (or not), rather than the actual state of being private itself.  
One could argue that individuals still retain complete control over 
whether or not to share personal information.  Our TOS agreement 
discussion,121 however, serves as a counterargument to that belief.  On 
paper, it would seem that the free market grants individuals seemingly 
limitless choices as to which data-collecting services to use, if any at all.  
Indeed, many would likely point to the ability of privacy-concerned 
individuals to abstain entirely from these services as justification for 
their claim that people still retain some level of control over their 
private information.  Irrespective of the realistic feasibility of total 
abstention, the perception our focus group respondents held was clear: 
respondents felt as though they had no choice but to use certain 
products—such as Google’s search engine—and to agree to its TOS 
contract.  Respondents articulated that abstention from interfacing with 
any internet services would preclude them from participating in society 
as the average person would.  It is this feeling—the belief that one must 
agree to TOS contracts or face societal ostracism—that is central to 
privacy’s loss of meaning in the public eye. 
  
 
 120 See supra p. 1443. 
 121 See supra Part IV.B. 
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As surfaced at the beginning of each of our focus groups, 
respondents’ relationship to privacy was defined not by privacy itself 
but by its competing interests.  In the eyes of many respondents, the 
compelling nature of these tradeoffs has essentially forced their hands 
in a variety of situations, thereby eliminating any feeling of control over 
their information.  Although technology has provided a new impetus for 
this exchange in the twenty-first century, individuals’ desire to trade 
privacy for a competing interest is by no means a new phenomenon.  In 
None of Your Damn Business, Lawrence Capello provides evidence that 
Americans were willing to exchange privacy for competing interests as 
early as the Gilded Age.122  In his analysis, Capello argues that the current 
state of privacy was not the inevitable result of technological progress, 
outlining several key moments throughout American history in which 
privacy was placed against a competing interest—and lost.123  This 
analysis appears to reveal an unspoken truth: maybe individuals never 
truly cared about the actual state of being private or anonymous.  
While it may be difficult to gauge public sentiment in the past, it 
may very well be possible that the loss of privacy’s meaning today can 
be attributed to the romanticization of a privacy-devoted world that 
never existed.  In this world, everyone chose anonymity without the fear 
of missing out.  In actuality, there were simply fewer opportunities to 
exchange privacy for competing interests in the past when compared to 
the opportunities that exist today, due in large part to the advancement 
of consumer technology.  Previous conceptions of privacy, therefore, did 
not have an impetus to distinguish the state of being private with the 
decision to be private, for this was once a distinction without a 
difference.  Today, however, shifting emphasis to the latter distinction 
could potentially provide a privacy framework that accounts for 
individuals’ desire for agency over their personal information, while 
also acknowledging their desire to occasionally share that information.  
To speak in terms of our frog metaphor, who could blame people 
for wanting warm water?  For as a Futurist may claim, society has now 
been ushered from a technological ice age into a paradise of information 
enlightenment.  Older conceptions of privacy, such as Westin’s, which 
rely heavily on promoting the benefits of anonymity as a principle 
component of privacy, may seem somewhat tone-deaf in a world where 
over two billion individuals have Facebook accounts.124  These previous 
 
 122 CAPELLO, supra note 95, at 5–6. 
 123 Id. at 3–4.  
 124 J. Clement, Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter 
2019, STATISTA (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-
of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide. 
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conceptions, which focus more on the condition of being private rather 
than the choice to enjoy that condition, are perhaps incompatible in a 
world defined not by what is withheld but by what is shared.125  From 
this perspective, it is unsurprising that respondents were unable to 
describe what exactly privacy meant to them, largely because 
traditional conceptions of privacy, which emphasize anonymity, are not 
easily compatible with individuals’ willingness and desire, in some 
instances, to share their information.  
This inability to reconcile contemporary norms with amorphous 
conceptions of privacy based on anonymity may be one reason 
individuals feel a lack of control.  Because traditional definitions of 
privacy emphasize the actual state of being private rather than the 
decision to retain that state (to whichever extent one chooses), 
individuals may tend to conceptualize sharing-abstinence as a more 
legitimate form of privacy instead of seeking out responsible ways to 
share information.126  This feeling of not having control is likely 
furthered by the need to seek out these responsible means rather than 
having them implemented as a legislative standard.127 
B.  What’s the Point? The Purpose of Privacy  
Advocates who champion privacy as an important part of human 
dignity may criticize a conception of privacy that de-emphasizes the 
actual condition of being private.  Political theorists such as Westin, for 
instance, have specifically cited the anonymity granted by privacy as a 
contributing factor in securing a person’s dignity.128  But fears that a 
model of privacy based around sharing, rather than withholding, would 
undermine individuals’ ability to maintain their dignity are undoubtedly 
unfounded for two reasons: the lack of association between privacy and 
dignity, and the dignity that is still maintained through choice.129  
  
 
 125 But see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013) 
(providing an alternative analysis that argues in favor of older conceptions of privacy). 
 126 For example, limiting which smartphone applications have access to certain kinds 
of data (i.e., location, Bluetooth, etc.), or restricting the ability of software to access data 
altogether.   
 127 For example, the European Union and California have implemented measures that 
may assist in granting users greater control over their data.  These measures are further 
explored in a later section.  See infra Section VI.B. 
 128 WESTIN, supra note 11. 
 129 See Auxier et al., supra note 49.  A majority of participants within the Pew Privacy 
Study responded that the developments of new tools allowing for individuals greater 
control over their personal information would be a more effective way to protect their 
personal information.  Id. 
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Throughout the focus groups, the purpose of privacy was discussed 
at great length.  Many, but not all, respondents cited the benefits that 
privacy offered in terms of protecting against potential harms,130 such 
as identity theft or other forms of financial loss.  Hardly any respondents 
reported that they believed privacy was an end in and of itself.  No 
respondents offered “human dignity” as a potential value of privacy that 
could compete against other interests such as convenience or 
security.131  The closest the discussion came to this topic were the 
instances in which individuals expressed concerns of government 
eavesdropping, but even then, these concerns were also met with “I have 
nothing to hide” claims from many other respondents.  Almost all 
respondents acknowledged, and even accepted, that today’s society is 
defined more by a cost/benefit calculation than it is insisting on the 
primacy value of human dignity.  
This is not to claim that rhetoric surrounding human dignity has no 
place in a new conception of privacy.  Instead, the lack of salience of the 
human dignity justification for privacy provides evidence as to why 
privacy has been so heavily eroded in the United States.  One reason 
privacy may have lost the battles outlined by Capello132 could be that the 
human dignity element of remaining anonymous was never that 
compelling to Americans, and given the advent of new technology and 
limitless information sharing, perhaps the human dignity argument is 
now less compelling than ever.  This is especially true given the ties 
between traditional conceptions of privacy, human dignity, and 
anonymity, or “the right to be let alone.”133  To the extent that humanity 
wishes to share more information than ever before, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that these arguments have not supported privacy 
throughout the history of the United States.  
Instead of associating human dignity with anonymity under older 
conceptions of privacy, dignity ought to instead be tied to choice.  It is 
the ability to decide whether or not to be private, and the extent thereof, 
that provides individuals with a sense of self-respect and worth, rather 
 
 130 An interesting point of contention from the focus groups was the extent to which 
these harms were actually realized.  While many focus group respondents used services 
that, at one point, have been electronically compromised in some way, only a few 
respondents cited cases in which they felt personally victimized by some violation of 
their privacy due to a company being hacked or otherwise storing data in an unsecure 
fashion.  The extent to which these harms are unrealized may contribute to claims that 
privacy concerns are often taken out of proportion.  
 131 See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1164–70 (2004) (comparing the United States’ 
emphasis on liberty to European emphasis on dignity for issues involving privacy).   
 132 CAPELLO, supra note 95, at 6. 
 133 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 139. 
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than the actual decision itself.  For instance, a person who elects to enjoy 
all of the competing interests of privacy at the cost of sharing their 
personal information retains no more or less dignity than a person who 
chooses to share nothing—so long as both individuals had the choice of 
deciding.  
Of course, creating and maintaining this choice is much easier said 
than done.  It may be tempting to identify the Pragmatist group of the 
Resignation Curve134 as the set of individuals who best exemplify this 
new conception of privacy.  After all, these were the respondents who 
had already begun to take measures135 with the hope of having better 
control over access to their private information.  Despite this 
observation, we would caution against turning Pragmatists into 
normative role models for other individuals in society if a robust 
conception of privacy is to be preserved.  The true takeaway from the 
Pragmatist section is the type of behavior that flourishes due, in large 
part, to the absence of other privacy protections.  Perhaps these 
individuals would be less inclined to engage with technologies that 
grant them greater control over their privacy if they believed that this 
control could be easily exerted through other means, such as legislative 
provisions that compel companies to implement such controls into their 
services.  
Certain jurisdictions have actually sought to implement legislation 
designed to grant their constituents greater control over their personal 
data.  The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which 
took effect in the European Union (EU) in May 2018, aims to protect all 
residents of the EU, meaning anyone living in the region falls under the 
same protective umbrella as citizens.136  To achieve this goal, all 
companies with an internet presence in the EU must comply with its 
regulations, including American businesses that have European 
websites.137  A second fundamental change resulting from this 
 
 134 See supra p. 1443. 
 135 See supra p. 1448.  
 136 Juliana De Groot, What Is the General Data Protection Regulation? Understanding 
& Complying with GDPR Requirements in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2020), 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation-
understanding-and-complying-gdpr-data-protection. 
 137 While companies may have implemented certain measures worldwide, GDPR 
provisions only protect EU residents.  Aarti Shahani, 3 Things You Should Know About 
Europe’s Sweeping New Data Privacy Law, NPR (May 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
sections/alltechconsidered/2018/05/24/613983268/a-cheat-sheet-on-europe-s-
sweeping-privacy-law (stating that U.S. citizens are not necessarily entitled to the same 
protections afforded to EU residents: “[i]n Europe, Facebook has to get permission to do 
facial recognition—and it’s not the default setting.  But in the U.S., it is. American users 
have to click through screens to opt out”).  
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legislation is an alteration in the definition of “personal data,” and, 
accordingly, what data are included in these protections.138  Some 
examples of categories of data not previously included are what you 
post, electronic medical records, mailing addresses, IP addresses, and 
GPS locations—all of which are now included as protected data.139  
These foundational alterations are crucial in understanding the 
legislation’s greater implications, as they alter previously caste-in-stone 
beliefs about what “should” or “should not” be considered private.140  
The GDPR contains several provisions designed to grant internet 
users greater control over their privacy.  For instance, to comply with 
the GDPR, all companies must conform to an opt-in style of data 
collection for any online services that track users’ information, with the 
goal of encouraging increased awareness of and transparency regarding 
the information being collected on the part of users themselves.141  
Furthermore, the GDPR empowers EU users to request that companies 
delete personal data they collect “without undue delay” or face potential 
penalties under the law.142  Other critical components of this legislation 
include: “[r]equiring the consent of individuals for data processing[;] 
[a]nonymizing collected data to protect privacy[;] [p]roviding data 
breach notifications[;] [s]afely handling the transfer of data across 
borders[;] [and] [r]equiring certain companies to appoint a data 
protection officer to oversee GDPR compliance.”143  This provides 
consumers an enormous amount of control over their data compared to 
the “wild west” of the internet as it had previously existed in Europe, 
and as it continues to exist throughout much of the United States, with 
some notable exceptions.144 
  
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2010, 2033–39 (2013) (discussing the potential implications of these new privacy 
classifications).  
 141 Shahani, supra note 137.  
 142 Id. 
 143 Juliana De Groot, What Is the General Data Protection Regulation? Understanding 
& Complying with GDPR Requirements in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2020), 
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation-
understanding-and-complying-gdpr-data-protection. 
 144 See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
771, 786–87 (2019) (comparing the GDPR with other legislative approaches taken 
around the world, primarily in Japan and the United States). 
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California presents what is likely the most notable of these 
exceptions.  As of January 1, 2020, California’s Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA) provides California residents145 with access to enhanced 
knowledge and control over their personal data.  Inspired by the 
GDPR,146 the CCPA provides California residents with rights to the 
following: (1) to know what personal data is being collected about them, 
and by whom; (2) to know whether their personal data is being sold or 
otherwise disclosed, and to whom; (3) to refuse to the sale of their 
personal data; (4) to regain and curb access to their personal data; (5) 
to request businesses to delete any personal data that they may have 
collected; and (6) to not face discrimination for exercising their right to 
privacy.147  The CCPA also provides California residents with legal 
standing to bring suit against any qualifying company that violates these 
provisions.148  
Importantly, both the GDPR and CCPA comport with the 
aforementioned new conception of privacy, as they do not seek to 
restrict the quantity of information that companies can collect but 
instead aim to give individuals greater awareness and control of their 
personal information.149  Given the laws’ recency, it remains to be seen 
what effect, if any, these pieces of legislation will have on the individuals’ 
behavior or general attitudes toward privacy.  At the very least, the 
GDPR and CCPA illustrate the potential influence that governments can 
wield in safeguarding their citizens’ capacity to control private 
information.150  This influence, however, can work both ways. 
 
 145 The provisions of the CCPA apply to all residents of California, and restrict any 
business, nonprofit or for-profit entity that collects personal data of consumers, 
conducts business practices in the state of California, and is characterized by at least one 
of three “thresholds.”. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (2018).  These thresholds include having 
a gross annual revenue of $25 million or more, having the ability to buy or sell the 
information of 50,000 or more individuals or separate households, and/or earning 51% 
or more of its gross annual revenue from data selling.  Id. 
 146 Although they share many similarities, there are several differences between the 
two pieces of legislation.  The most notable is that the CPPA protects data that originated 
from the consumer directly, while the GDPR extends protections to cover data 
purchased by third parties as well.  Nicholas Moline, 2019 Changed the Internet Forever, 
JUSTIA (Jan. 3, 2020), https://onward.justia.com/2020/01/03/2019-changed-
everything.  
 147 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2018).  
 148 For further discussion of the origins of CCPA and GDPR, see Anupam Chander et 
al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 149 Nicholas Moline, 2019 Changed the Internet Forever, JUSTIA (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://onward.justia.com/2020/01/03/2019-changed-everything. 
 150 Contra Woodrow Harztog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and 
the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1696–97 (2020) (providing an 
alternative analysis of GDPR, especially its potential shortcomings if similar legislation 
is applied in the United States). 
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The most glaring case of government influence working against 
privacy deserves special mention—China.  Today, technology is being 
deployed in the Chinese mainland to increase control over the 
population under the guise of keeping civil order and promoting moral 
norms, with the most common systems being facial recognition coupled 
with large-scale data collection.151  Approximately 300 million facial 
recognition cameras are being installed in train stations, at crosswalks, 
on light fixtures, traffic signals, and buildings.152  Furthermore, pilot 
testing for a social credit system is already taking place, in which the 
government assigns credit scores to citizens based on their personal 
habits and the scores of their associates.  The Chinese government uses 
those factors to indicate the presence of traits the Chinese Communist 
Party finds desirable in its citizens.153  Currently, these pilots are facing 
technical barriers due to the sheer amount of data that must be 
processed,154 but this is a limitation that may not exist one 
day—possibly soon.  
The aforementioned developments do not stop at China’s borders.  
Already, Chinese firms are working with foreign governments to spread 
facial recognition technology.  Eighteen countries155—including 
Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Germany—are using Chinese-made monitoring systems.156  Chinese 
technology is expanding past Chinese borders,157 so Americans face the 
question of whether such a system could exist here, and what it may look 
like.  This may boil down to cultural questions and tolerance for privacy 
invasions on a national level, but these are questions that people must 
ask while they still can.  
An old adage states, “knowledge is power.”  We now live in an 
information age with nearly limitless information available—but not 
information all possesses equal value.  Whether the end goals of 
companies or governments are commercial gain or societal power, the 
 
 151 China Invents the Digital Totalitarian State, ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2016).  
 152 Id. 
 153 Mareike Ohlberg, Shazeda Ahmed, & Bertram Lang, Central Planning, Local 
Experiments: The Complex Implementation of China’s Social Credit System, MERCATOR 
INSTITUTE FOR CHINA STUDIES (Dec. 12, 2017). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel & Melissa Chan, Made in China, Exported to the World: 
The Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES (April 24, 2019).  Thirty-six countries have received 
training in topics such as “public opinion guidance . . . which is typically a euphemism 
for censorship.”  Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Amy Hawkins, Beijing’s Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 
24, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/beijings-big-brother-tech-needs-
african-faces. 
HEUMANN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2021  12:26 PM 
2021] PRIVACY IN THE PUBLIC EYE 1459 
collection of personal data has proven to be among the most valuable 
information that exists today in achieving these ends.  Understanding 
the value of this information and deciding for oneself what to do with 
it—whether to enjoy a state of privacy or the seemingly endless benefits 
of exchanging information (or to exist somewhere in between)—is 
among the greatest challenges for humanity in the age of information. 
To refer once again to our Frogs analogy, the amphibians perhaps 
need not make the water cooler again—for that would be difficult to 
convince others to do, and even those that might have once preferred 
colder water now enjoy the warmth.  Rather, the solution is to ensure 
that they themselves have their hands on the faucet, ever vigilant of 
reaching the boiling point.  
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APPENDIX A: GENERAL SCRIPT/QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUPS 
Hello all, and thank you for participating in our study!  We have 
been exploring the idea of a “right to privacy” amongst ourselves, and 
we are excited to hear opinions on this topic from people outside of our 
team.  Our goal is to be able to initiate a conversation, through which we 
will be able to hear each of your viewpoints about privacy and related 
issues.  We hope that you find this conversation as intriguing as we do, 
and please feel free to interject with opinions, thoughts or questions at 
any time.  
• Like (previous person) just mentioned, we’d like to start by 
asking very broad questions.  For starters, the word 
privacy has many different meanings to many different 
people.  We hear the word “privacy,” but specifically what 
does privacy mean to you?  
• Additionally, which information do you consider private?  
• So let’s say right now I want to know the male to female ratio 
at Rutgers.  How would you find out this answer for me? 
• So we’ve all used Google before, and you just did this search.  
Something interesting that we found was that you 
automatically agree to Google’s terms and services 
agreement.  Were you aware of that? 
• How do you feel about it?  Some people tend to feel 
uncomfortable; some people think it’s fine.  How do you 
feel? Why? 
• There’s some people who want these terms and conditions 
to be up front, ask permission type; some are fine with the 
way Google’s terms are.  How do you feel about this? 
• How often would you say you read the terms and services 
agreements?  Why? 
• How do you feel about terms and services agreements? 
• Do the terms and services agreements ever change whether 
or not you use that service?  Like, would you stop using 
Google and use, say, DuckDuckGo because the TOS 
changed? 
• What are your impressions of these documents?  How would 
you describe them? 
• Companies tend to reserve the right to change their TOS 
whenever they like, so they’ll change it midyear and then 
notify you that “we have updated our Terms and Services 
agreement.”  How do you feel when this happens? 
• There are sites where when you click on them, they have a 
popup saying “by using our website you agree to our 
terms and services.”  Do you prefer this kind of consent, or 
do you prefer manually clicking yes? 
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• What do you feel about websites that have the popup?  Do 
you like it when that happens?  Or would you rather they 
not bother? 
• Do you have social media?  So let’s take social media and 
location services.  A lot of social media will ask permission 
to collect location data and see where you’ve been.  And it 
enables a few things, like your Lyft being able to find you 
or your friends being able to know where you took that 
photo.  Do you have that enabled? 
• How do you feel about companies having that information? 
• What are all the ways you think companies use data?  What 
are all the ways you think they get this data? 
• Would you rather pay for services like Google or Facebook, 
or is the current system better in your opinion? 
• Where do you think permission will go in the future?  Do you 
think companies are going to be more or less likely to ask 
permission? 
• Do you think you’ll be giving up more or less information in 
the future?  
• What is consent, and how/when should it be given?  
o Must it be explicit?  
o Can it be coerced? 
• Next, we’d like to talk about a more specific form of consent, 
the type of consent that certainly occurs between 
companies and individuals, but also a type of consent that 
may commonly occur between private individuals 
themselves.  The type of consent we would now like to 
discuss involves individuals being recorded. 
• For individuals recording other individuals, there are mainly 
two schools of thought:  
• Eleven states, including California, have adopted two-party 
consent laws for recording conversations.  Two-party 
consent laws require both parties to agree to the 
recording of a conversation.  How do you feel about this? 
• New Jersey is one of the other thirty-eight states which 
requires only one party to have knowledge of a recording.  
Do you tend to favor this? 
• If you believe in one-party consent, what are some reasons 
why you might see the benefits of two-party laws? 
• If you believe in two-party consent, what are some 
situations in which one-party consent may prove 
beneficial? 
• Even amongst our group, there is disagreement about 
consent in extreme cases, such as a battered woman 
recording her abusive husband.  Do you see a conflict 
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between the values of, for example, safety and that of 
privacy? 
• Should all recorded conversations be admissible as evidence 
in court?  How about in order to obtain a warrant for 
arrest?  What about to prove wrongdoing at the workplace 
or in an academic environment? 
• Suppose the police suspect that you are plotting to commit a 
heinous crime.  They are seeking information from your 
phone that may connect you to this crime.  They want 
access to such data as your messages, your email, your 
photos, and your location data.  We are curious about the 
level of difficulty that law enforcement will encounter in 
obtaining your data.  My first two questions concern your 
belief about the way the world currently works in this 
area.  The questions I will ask after concern how you 
believe the world should work, according to your opinion. 
• Which data from your phone do you believe will be easiest 
for the police to obtain?  
• Which data from your phone do you believe will be the most 
difficult for the police to obtain? 
• Which data from your phone should be the easiest for police 
to obtain?  Why? 
• Which data from your phone should be the hardest for 
police to obtain?  Why? 
• Good afternoon!  I’ve been looking into different aspects of 
privacy, and how the expectations of which may vary 
depending on the type of information and the different 
companies or organizations that may be collecting it.  To 
do this, I’m going to ask you all a series of simple A or B 
questions, for which I ask that you choose one of the two 
options.  We will do this anonymously, and I ask that you 
all close your eyes and raise your hands (yes, we’re going 
back to elementary school voting here).  I will present the 
two options to you, and then ask you to raise your hands 
for each option.  Ready?  
o Who do you trust more (more comfortable 
with knowing):  
▪ NSA or Facebook  
▪ Post office or Amazon  
▪ FBI or Google 
▪ FCC or Verizon 
▪ Treasury or credit card companies  
o Would you rather have the govt or a private 
company knowing: 
▪ your credit card info  
▪ your location at all times  
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▪ your call history  
▪ who you associate with  
▪ what you purchase  
▪ where you’ve been sleeping  
▪ your political leanings 
• Quick recap/explanation of votes above 
• General recap of conversation/entire group: What do you 
think privacy will look like in the future?  
o Why do you think so? 
o Can you describe this in one word?  
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APPENDIX B: RESPONDENTS’ ONE-WORD DESCRIPTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE 
FUTURE 
Focus Group I (Seniors) 
• We will get used to drinking the poison. 
• We will be more aware of it, but it isn’t going to get better. 
• We are more aware of it.  We’re more careful.  Is it better?  
Probably not, but we’re more aware now. 
Focus Group 2 (Middle Age) 
• Scary, unknown 
• Unknown but we are catching bad guys 
• Uncontrolled 
• Uncontrolled and concerned 
• Not sure if liberal democracy will balance against 
authoritarian dystopia and terrible stuff 
• More complex in the future; privacy means different things 
• Positive about the future—we will work out the issues 
• Going in a negative direction 
Focus Group 3 (Young Adults) 














• Safeguards will be enlarged 
• Fragile 
• Precarious—”thank goodness we are of the age that it is not 
going to be our problem” 
Focus Group 5 (Young Adults) 
• Some or none 
• Definition of privacy will change twenty years from now.  
There will be a different technological environment.  We 
are a transitional generation.  There will be ramped up 
technology. 
• The term ‘privacy’ will lose its meaning.  In twenty years we 
will say, “what is privacy?”  It will just get lost, be 
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meaningless.  With more sophisticated technology, 
privacy will be meaningless. 
• Even though privacy is decreasing, most of the public knows 
this, and therefore may become more protective [with 
respect to government and private corporations and 
privacy].  The fact that people realize they are being 
watched/located may lead to more policies. 
• Meaningless 
• Meaningless but will still want privacy 




Focus Group 6 (Middle Age) 
• Scary—going down slippery slope where all know about me 




• Real—more and more we’ll accept the changes as they’re 
inevitable. 
 
